The Austrian School of Economics has always taken a deep interest in methodological issues, and has used its methodological reflections to build substantive theories towards explaining the role of knowledge in economic life. This 'double' interest for knowledge within the Austrian School can be traced back at least to Alfred Schutz's 1932 thesis The Phenomenology of the Social World, which was written within the context of the Ludwig von Mises' seminar group. A central idea in this thesis is that conceptualizations in the social sciences are of a second-order nature, since they build on the conceptualizations already formed by social actors in their everyday lives about other social actors. In this article I try to trace how Alfred Schutz's writings on scientific and everyday knowledge were influenced by and in turn influenced Austrian economists, including Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Oskar Morgenstern, and Fritz Machlup. Furthermore, I raise the question of why Alfred Schutz himself as well as Fritz Machlup took an apologetic stance towards neoclassical economics, while Friedrich Hayek and Oskar Morgenstern were much more critical of the orthodoxy. In answering this question I argue that while Schutz and Machlup both defended equilibrium economics based on a conventionalist-instrumentalist view, Hayek and to some degree Morgenstern proposed to build more process-oriented models relying on a realist view of scientific explanations. KEY WORDS . equilibrium and process model . ideal type . knowledge problem . rational choice
Introduction
Within the Austrian School of Economics there has always been a close relationship between methodological reflections on the one hand and how economic phenomena are studied on the other.
Take for instance Hayek's (1978) idea that 'market processes' can be studied as 'processes of discoveries'. In this case, a concept from the philosophy of science is imported into economics in order to provide a new understanding of how market institutions function. But the relationship between methodology and economics may also be reversed, as demonstrated by another of Hayek's contributions. From his studies of equilibrium economics, Hayek 'discovered' that economists had been studying equilibrium states without explaining how economic agents could obtain the knowledge necessary to reach the equilibrium position. And finally, the life-long interest in the methodology of economics brought Fritz Machlup (1982) at a very late state in his life into the project entitled Knowledge: Its Creation, Distribution, and Economic Significance, which may be seen as a precursor of today's studies of the Knowledge Society, Information Society, and Knowledge Management.
These three examples show how methodological-philosophical studies and social-economic studies have been interrelated within the Austrian School to produce new and fresh insights. In this article, I argue that we may find the origin of these fruitful interrelationships in Alfred Schutz's (1899 Schutz's ( -1959 early contributions on the 'Phenomenology of the Social World'. In Section 2, I present a short introduction to Alfred Schutz's methodology of the social sciences, stressing his reformulation of Max Weber's concept of ideal types. In Section 3, I show that Alfred Schutz's work has been an important contribution not only to the methodology of the social sciences, but also to economic theory in general. The main argument is that Schutz was not just interested in how economists used conceptual frameworks or typifications to explain how economic agents behaved and interacted with each other. His phenomenology was also formulated to provide an understanding of the typifications that ordinary individuals (economic agents) used to understand the behavior of other individuals when taking decisions in an interdependent social system. I then turn to an understanding of how different Austrian economists -such as Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek, Oskar Morgenstern, and Fritz Machlup (all belonging to the Ludwig von Mises' seminar) -have been pursuing this so-called knowledge problem within different areas of economics. In Section 4, I discuss Alfred Schutz's reformulation of the methodological foundation of Austrian Economics by replacing Carl Menger's and Mises' aprioristic methodology with a conventionalist methodology. In Section 5, I study how Hayek identified a 'knowledge problem' in standard equilibrium theory by asking how economic agents could obtain the necessary knowledge to reach an equilibrium position. I attempt, in Section 6, to trace a similar 'knowledge problem' in game theory by arguing that game theory, from its very inception, was influenced by another Austrian economist, Oskar Morgenstern. It was Morgenstern's ambition to solve this 'knowledge problem' by replacing standard neo-classical theory with game theory. While Hayek and Morgenstern had mainly been studying the knowledge problem from an economic theorist's point of view, the contributions of Fritz Machlup, taken up in Section 7, were mainly of a methodological nature. Fritz Machlup was applying Schutz's methodology in order to build what Mark Blaug (1980) called the 'classical defense' of orthodox economics. In Section 8, I start out by asking why Schutz, Hayek, Morgenstern and Machlup followed such different research strategies and why they ended up taking such different attitudes toward orthodox neo-classical economics. While Hayek and Morgenstern may be classified as, respectively, a revolutionary and a reformer of orthodox neo-classical economics, Fritz Machlup may best be described as an apologetic. I explain these different positions as depending on whether they adopted a realist or an instrumentalistconventionalist view of explanation. While Machlup and Schutz were adopting the covering law model and favored a conventionalistinstrumentalist interpretation that led to an outcome/equilibrium perspective, Hayek and Morgenstern seemed to have leaned more toward a realist view of economic theory, favoring a 'processoriented' perspective on economic phenomena. In Section 9, I try to summarize some of the implications regarding economic modeling that follow from the analysis.
A Short Introduction to Alfred Schutz's Methodology of the Social Sciences
Max Weber's methodology of the social sciences was an attempt to solve some of the problems in the classical 'Methodenstreit' in the 1880s between the Austrian School on the one side and the German Historical School on the other. However, Weber's central concept of an ideal type was itself rather ambiguous, and during the first two decades of the last century a series of incompatible interpretations was put forward. One of the most important controversies concerned the proper domain of ideal types. Some methodologists argued that ideal types should be used exclusively within history; others argued that the construct of an ideal type was only to be used within the social sciences, particularly those that had theoretical ambitions; yet others argued that all social sciences made use of ideal types. Among economic methodologists, for instance, there was no consensus on whether the construct of 'economic man' was in fact an ideal type or not. However, most of these uncertainties were solved with the publication of Alfred Schutz's book Die sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt in 1932 [The Phenomenology of the Social World]. According to both philosophers and sociologists, Alfred Schutz's work was primarily an attempt to reconcile the work of Max Weber with the work of the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl. The study of phenomenology is the study of how we structure our consciousness about other individuals and society in general. However, since we rarely direct our attention to this consciousness, we take it for granted and treat it as a kind of tacit knowledge. Or, as Koppl argues:
We are rather ignorant of all the structures of human consciousness. We live in them without directing our attention to them, just as fish swims in water without considering what water is or how it behaves. Phenomenological psychology directs our attention to the structures of human consciousness (2000: 602).
The core of Schutz's contribution was that ideal types are not only a way of constructing concepts within social science and history, they are also used by individuals in their everyday lives when interacting with other individuals. As actors, we always rely, according to Schutz, on pre-existing knowledge of different stereotypes or 'typifications' that tell us what behavior to expect from other social actors. We are therefore 'constituted' by our stock of knowledge consisting of those typifications that are either biologically/culturally inherited or learned from experience. Consequently, the construction of models and concepts in the social sciences is always based on an already existing fund of common sense understandings of social reality. Thus, an important thesis in Schultz's phenomenology is that when researchers construct models within the social scientific sphere, they deal with a reality which has already been understood and interpreted by those 'objects', i.e. the human beings that our theoretical frameworks attempt to model.
The principal difference between the natural and the social sciences, according to Alfred Schutz, is that the reality upon which the social sciences build their ideal types and models has already been experienced and interpreted by the 'objects' themselves, i.e. the individuals of the scientific analysis. In the natural science, on the other hand, the reality consists of 'dead' objects, such as atoms and molecules, which are incapable of experiencing and interpreting the world around them.
1 But if the reality of the social sciences builds on how individuals interpret the world, then the ideal types of social sciences must be ideal types of a second order. That is, these ideal types must build upon or be derived from other ideal types that the social actors themselves have formed in order to act in the social world.
One of Alfred Schutz's most important contributions to the methodology of social science was his introduction of a scale of ideal types based on their degree of anonymity. In situations of direct social interaction our ideal types will normally be rich in details and contain a large amount of concrete information about other social actors. On the other hand, in situations of more indirect forms of interaction, our typifications will be less specific and less concrete, giving a rather anonymous picture of other social actors. Schutz explains this scale from thick to thin or from concrete to anonymous typifications in the following way:
The more anonymous the typifying construct is the more detached it is from the uniqueness of the individual fellowman involved, the fewer aspects also of his personality and behavior pattern enter the typification as being relevant for the purpose at hand, for the sake of which the type has been constructed. If we distinguish between (subjective) personal types and (objective) course-of-action types we may say that increasing anonymisation of the construct leads to the superseding of the former by the latter. In complete anonymisation the individuals are supposed to be interchangeable, and the course-of-action type refers to behavior of 'whomever' acting in the way defined by the construct (1953/1962: 17-18 ).
This scale, from concrete to anonymous types, characterizes not just how social actors build ideal types of other social actors, but also how social scientists construct their second-order ideal types in explaining social phenomena. Schutz argues that in the social sciences it is the problem that the researcher is confronted with or tries to solve (for instance, in terms of which level of analysis he or she operates on) that determines the type of ideal types that will be appropriate to use:
It follows that any shifting of the problem under scrutiny and the level of research involves a modification of the structure of relevance and the constructs formed for the solution of another problem or on another level; a great many misunderstandings and controversies especially in the social sciences originate from disregarding this fact (1953/1962: 30) .
For instance, an economist who is interested in the behavior of a specific firm will construct a much more concrete ideal type than an economist who studies the interaction of firms in an industry and therefore uses anonymous ideal types.
2 Our analysis may therefore deal with phenomena of very different degrees of generality in terms of the conceptual schemes used. Highly anonymous types may for instance be relied upon when the 'law of large number' applies or when each individual actor counts only a little. Much more specific and richer types may be used when we analyze more direct forms of interaction. As I discuss in Section 7, the distinction between different degrees of anonymity has been used not just to separate between theories of atomistic competition and theories of monopoly and oligopolistic competition as anonymous and more specific types, respectively; it has also been used to distinguish between the anonymous types used in the 'marginalist' research program versus the more concrete and specific types used by 'behavioral' researchers such as Cyert and March (1963) .
This then brings me to another important question. What is the relationship between a social actor's own ideal types and the ideal types of the social sciences? Schutz argues that the ideal types in the social sciences should fulfill three important criteria. First, within the social sciences the construction of ideal types should be subject to stricter requirements regarding consistency (the postulate of logical consistency) than the construct of ideal types in our everyday life. The ideal types in the social sciences should therefore be more formal, general, abstract, etc., than those we use in our everyday lives to interpret the actions of other actors. Secondly, the ideal types in the social sciences must fulfill the criterion that the motives ascribed to our ideal types are 'adequate on the level of meant meaning' (the postulate of subjective interpretation). According to this criterion, the ideal types that we build to explain observable phenomena, such as changes in prices, interest rates, employment, etc., should be understandable as corresponding to the intentions and goals of the acting individuals. That is, the explanation should be plausible in the sense of reflecting the meant meaning in the minds of the acting individuals. Thirdly, the ideal types used by the social scientist 'must', according to Schutz (1953 Schutz ( /1962 , 'be constructed in such a way that a human act performed within the life world by an individual actor . . . would be understandable for the actor himself . . . in terms of common-sense interpretation of everyday life'. This criterion (the postulate of adequacy) is intended to secure a correspondence between the constructs of the social scientist and the constructs of our common-sense experience.
3
In summary, we may characterize the methodological framework of Alfred Schutz as an interesting attempt to reconcile the subjectivist 'verstehen' tradition and its idea of subjective interpretation with an objectivist tradition of conventionalism that builds on the covering-law model and demand that we test our theories by testing their implications/predictions. According to Austrian economists, Schutz's phenomenology constituted a significant contribution to the methodological understanding of economics as a scientific field. However, it is probably less well known that Schutz's analyses may also be interpreted as an important (though so far not well recognized) contribution to economic theory. 5 This becomes more obvious when we call to mind that Schutz was not only interested in the methodological question of how economic theorists constructed typifications of economic agents, but also in how economic agents themselves made typifications of other economic agents in their everyday lives. And developing such a theory of how economic agents can create intersubjective knowledge about each other would be a first, but important, step toward a solution to the coordination problem in economics: Why does interaction between economic agents in most cases lead to reasonably coordinated outcomes rather than chaos?
Since a social actor is not alone in the social world, but interacts with other social actors, a solution to the coordination problem in economics must start from how actors form expectations about each other's actions and how these expectations can be stabilized to make a coordinated outcome feasible. But in which direction should one expect Austrians to look for a solution to this problem? An obvious answer would be that they recall Carl Menger's (1883 Menger's ( / 1963 argument that many coordination problems are solved by spontaneously emerging institutions, that is social rules, which stabilize the agents' expectations of one another's decisions and hence set a standard for how similar coordination problems should be solved in the future.
More recently, A. Schotter (1981) and R. Sugden (1986) have used modern game theory to model Carl Menger's theory of how social institutions emerge as responses to different kinds of repeated social problems of coordination. In their models, a social institution is a regularity, R, in a population P, where the social actors are confronted with a repeated problem, S, and it is common knowledge that 1) all follow R 2) everyone expects everyone to follow R 3) everyone prefers to follow R, if all other actors follow R, since S is a coordination game (cf. Schotter 1981) . According to this definition, a social institution is the selection of one out of several possible Nash equilibria.
In his article 'Common-sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action', Schutz argues that social actors can anticipate each other's behavior because they are able to create intersubjective types of one another's behavior. While modern game theorists talk about social rules as Nash equilibria and say that these rules are common knowledge among interacting agents, Schutz refers to the possibility of having intersubjective knowledge by establishing 'reciprocal perspectives' among the social actors in a social system: Common-sense thinking overcomes the differences in individual perspectives . . . by two basic idealizations: 1) The idealization of the interchangeability of the standpoints: I take it for granted -and assume my fellow-man does the samethat if I change places with him so that that his 'here' becomes mine, I shall be at the same distance from things and see them with the same typicality as he actually does . . . 2) The idealization of the congruency of the system of relevancies: Until counterevidence I take it for granted -and assume my fellow-man does the same -that the difference in perspectives originating in our unique biographical situations are irrelevant for the purposes at hand of either of us . . . ' (1953/1962: 12) .
And this 'thesis of reciprocal perspectives' leads us, according to Schutz, To the apprehension of objects and their aspects actually known by me and potentially known by you as everyone's knowledge. Such knowledge is conceived to be objective and anonymous, i.e., detached from and independent of my and my fellow man's definition of the situation, our unique biographical circumstances and the actual and potential purposes involved therein (1953/1962: 12). However, in the same way that game theorists do not explain how common knowledge emerges, Schutz does not explain in detail how social actors actually obtain such intersubjective knowledge. From this perspective, Schutz's theory of 'reciprocity of perspectives' may be viewed as an 'equilibrium' theory that does not tell us how this state may be reached. When using completely anonymous ideal types and applying the principle of reciprocity of perspectives, we take away all differences of perspectives originating in differences of the person's 'biographically determined situation' and assume that the different system of relevancies can be made conformable. That is, while anonymous ideal types are completely 'timeless' constructions and the typified individuals are interchangeable, the concrete typifications will exist in 'historical time' and have personal biographies and 'stocks of knowledge' that consist of a rule system of either socially transmitted or individually learned rules. Consequently, using anonymous types implies reasoning about a world where all actors are interpreted as identical and interchangeable, making reasoning in terms of 'representative actors' 6 adequate, but at the same time excludes 'population thinking'.
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The tendency in much of game theory and other economic theories to accept only anonymous ideal types may, however, sometimes be counterproductive. In setting up a definition of what constitutes rational behavior, game theorists use the principle of symmetry, implying that a player has to apply the same form of rationality to his opponent that he applies to himself (i.e. maximizing expected utility). However, by applying this principle of symmetry, the players will ignore information about the identity of opponents that real actors typically will use to form expectations about another actor's behavior. For instance, they will be unable to solve simple games -such as the coordination games -that have fairly simple 'focal point' solutions in real life. As Schelling remarks, 'If a man knocks at the door and says that he will stab himself on the porch unless given 10 dollars, he is more likely to get the 10 dollars if his eyes are bloodshot ' (1980: 22) . By excluding information about an opponent's identity, game theorists dismiss information that actors in the real world would have used in order to solve a coordination or cooperative game. Forming too anonymous types that are completely interchangeable will therefore often make the game more rather than less difficult to solve.
Schutz, Menger and Mises on the Methodological Foundation of Austrian Economics
Alfred Schutz, the founder of phenomenological sociology, is normally viewed as a central figure in the establishment of the interpretative paradigm in sociology owing to his focus on the actor's subjective ideas and world-views. However, in keeping with the Christopher Prendergast (1986) interpretation, I think that a much more appropriate understanding of the work of Alfred Schutz will emerge if we view him as a long-standing member of the Austrian School in Economics. 8 In fact, Schutz became a member of the Ludwig von Mises' seminar group as early as 1922 and remained an active member for more than 10 years.
In the 1920s and early 1930s, Mises was the leading scholar in the Austrian tradition. It was he who in 1922 took on the responsibility of maintaining the school's distinctive philosophical, political and theoretical approach by reinstituting the seminar that had been run from 1905 to 1915 by the Austrian economist Eugen von Bo¨hm-Bawerk. During the period from 1922 to 1934, Mises not only kept the Austrian tradition alive, but was also instrumental in its advancement and reformulation. The 'Mises' seminar' was a private study group that met twice a month in Mises' office in the Austrian Chamber of Commerce. Among the better-known participants besides Schutz and von Mises were Felix Kaufmann, Gottfried Harbeler, Friedrich Hayek, Fritz Machlup, Oskar Morgenstern, Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan, Gerhard Tintner, and others. It was in the latter part of this period that Alfred Schutz started on his thesis on 'The Phenomenology of the Social World' and some of the first outlines were presented to the Mises seminar in the early 1930s. By doing so, Schutz not only built a new methodological foundation for the social sciences, but also provided a necessary reformulation of the methodological foundation of Austrian economics. 9 In this process, the strict aprioristic interpretation of economics that had been dominant since Menger was replaced with a conventionalist understanding in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
Prendergast has argued that the primary audience of Schutz's thesis was not sociologists or philosophers, but 'the group of scholars interested in the methodological problems of the social sciences, especially those defending or modifying the epistemological standpoint of the Austrian School ' (1986: 3) . In fact, Schutz's thesis may be interpreted as an attempt to protect the theoretical structure of Austrian Economics by correcting some serious shortcomings in its methodological self-understanding. During the 1920s, with the emergence of the Logical Empiricist Program in Vienna, it became more and more obvious to Schutz that the classical Austrian defense of a 'universal science of human action' as set out by the founder of the School, Carl Menger (1883 Menger ( /1985 and later refined by Ludwig von Mises (1933) was, indeed, in need of a major reformulation. The main reason for such a reformulation was that the Austrians had built their defense upon an untenable rationalistic-justificationist framework. Instrumental in convincing Schutz about the urgency of this reformulation was his close friend, Felix Kaufmann, who not only belonged to the Mises seminar, but at the same time was a (loyal but critical) member of the Wienerkreiss of Moritz Schlick and the other positivist philosophers. It was Felix Kaufmann who seemed to have convinced Schutz of the superiority of viewing the basic assumptions in a theory, not as synthetic a priori principles, but as 'conventions' or 'procedural rules' that were neither true nor false, but appraised according to their 'heuristic value '. 10 According to Schutz there were two 'Problems of Knowledge' in Austrian Economics that threatened to undermine the whole School. The first of these two knowledge problems was that of how individual actors in the economy were able to obtain knowledge about the behaviour of other actors in reaching some reasonable coordinated outcome. This is what some later theorists have called the 'coordination of expectation' problem (cf. T. Schelling, 1980) . The second but related 'Knowledge Problem' concerns the kind of methodological status economic researchers can attribute to their theories. As I have argued in Section 2, Schutz tried to solve these two interrelated problems by extending Max Weber's theory of ideal types and introducing a scale of more or less anonymous types.
As stated by Schutz, the first knowledge problem was due to the fact that Austrian economics lacked a satisfactory theory of intersubjective understanding. That is, the Austrians from Menger to Mises did not give a reasonable account of how an economic agent could come to know the motives of other agents. Most of the Austrians had argued that economic agents used 'introspection' as a method to read the motives of other agents. However, according to Schutz, the Austrians had never really explained how economic agents obtained knowledge about other agent's knowledge, even though they made references to processes such as 'empathy', 'introspection', and 'intuition' as a basis for obtaining what they described as absolute true knowledge about other agents. But for Schutz these were exaggerated and unsubstantiated claims.
The second knowledge problem was due to the fact that the Austrians built upon what Alfred Schutz regarded as an antiquated, rationalistic account of the a priori character of science. In defending economics as a universal and theoretical science in the classical Methodenstreit, Carl Menger had relied upon Aristotle's 'essentialist realist' position within philosophy.
11 In his major methodological treatise, Untersuchungen u¨ber die Methode der Socialwissenschaftten und der Politische O¨konomie insbesondere, from 1883 (translated in 1963 as Investigations into the Methods of the Social Sciences), Menger wrote, Theoretical economics has the task of studying the general nature (das generelle Wesen) and the general inter-connections of economic phenomena, not of analyzing economic concepts and drawing the logical conclusions resulting from this analysis. The phenomena, or certain aspects of them, and not their linguistic image, the concepts, are the objects of theoretical research in the field of economics (1883/1963: 37n). According to Menger's essentialist view of science, the researcher should therefore immerse him or herself in the real essence of an object, such as, for instance, the phenomenon of money, in order to be able to explain it. Consequently, we should go behind the observable qualities and reveal the internal constitution of a phenomenon such as money in order to explain it. Menger firmly believed that there were a priori categories ('essences') in reality and that these could be discovered through our theoretical efforts. Consequently, ontological questions occupied center stage in Menger's methodology and it was evident that he was a realist in the sense that scientific concepts should refer to real phenomena. However, from Schutz's more moderate conventionalist perspective on science, neither his 'essentialist' nor his 'realist' perspective was acceptable.
While Carl Menger (1883 Menger ( /1963 took his point of departure in Aristotle's 'essentialist realist' position in defending Austrian eco-nomics as an a priori science, Ludwig von Mises (1933 Mises ( /1960 relied upon Kant and his discussion of synthetic a priori categories. While Menger had argued that there were a priori categories/universals of economic reality (essences) that could be discovered through our theoretical efforts, Mises argued that a priori knowledge was much more a creature of our own minds. For instance, the category of a causal relation is something that our mind imposes upon the world, since we can never observe a cause, but only a correlation. Similarly, just as the concept of a cause is a category in the natural sciences, the concept of action may be seen as an a priori category in the science of human action (praxeology), according to Mises. Consequently, he argued that:
All concepts and theorems of praxeology are implied in the category of human action . . . The only way to a cognition of these theorems is logical analysis of our inherent knowledge of the category of action. We must bethink ourselves and reflect upon the structure of human action. Like logic and mathematics, praxeological knowledge is in us; it does not come from without (1933/1960 ).
Barry Smith has described the main difference between Menger's and Mises' positions as being a difference between a reflectionist and an impositionist view. While the reflectionists argued that we can have a priori knowledge as a result of the fact that some structures in the world can be understood in their own right, the impositionists argued that a priori categories reflected the structure of our mind.
Influenced directly by Felix Kaufmann and indirectly by the logical empiricists, Alfred Schutz found that neither of these variations of an a priori methodology served the Austrian School well. In order to avoid criticism for 'exaggerated claims' within Austrian economics 'for the power of deductions and a priori reasoning', Schutz found that it was necessary to replace the a priori methodology of Menger and Mises with a conventionalist methodology.
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In the Misean methodology there were strict limits as to what one could raise doubts about, since a priori categories were like a conceptual prison that was a non-replaceable element of a scientific field. However, at the turn of the 19th century two French conventionalist philosophers, Pierre Duhem and Henri Poincare, argued that what Kant had described as a priori categories could more appropriately be described as 'tacit conventions' that for some time ruled the problem-solving activity in a scientific field. However, these 'conventions' were not conceptual prisons, as argued by Kant (and Mises) because from time to time they were replaced by another set of conventions, as when Euclidian geometry was replaced with non-Euclidian geometry.
13 Similarly, the concept of maximization rationality was a convention that could be replaced with another concept of rationality or another behavioral principle.
Schutz, Hayek, and the 'Knowledge Problem' in Neo-classical Economics
Although Alfred Schutz and Friedrich Hayek were both members of the seminar group of Ludwig von Mises in the 1920s and early 1930s and were holding similar views, they ended up taking very different positions with regard to orthodox economic theory later in their lives. While Alfred Schutz can broadly be described as an apologetic of orthodox economics (in the sense that his methodology was used not only by himself, but also by his friend Fritz Machlup (1946 Machlup ( , 1955 Machlup ( , 1967 , as important input to the classical defense of orthodox neo-classical economics), Friedrich Hayek started working within the framework of orthodox economics, but after his 'transformation' 14 ended up arguing for a much broader and philosophically inspired evolutionary-institutional framework within economics. What were the reasons for this divergence? I think that an answer to this question may be found in the fact that Schutz and Hayek reacted very differently to what Prendergast (1986) has described as the 'crises' of the Austrian School in the late 1920s and early 1930s. While Schutz adopted the conventionalist methodology of Felix Kaufmann as a reaction to the perceived problems in the strict rationalistic methodology of Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek adopted a realist and fallibilist position in terms of methodology. However, Hayek did not come to this position simply by replacing Mises' rationalism with Popper's falsificationism, as argued by Hutchison (1992) . Rather, it seems more likely that Hayek's methodological position emerged as a result of his struggle to make sense of the concept of knowledge in equilibrium economics. Consequently, I think that we may find some important clues in his famous 1937 classic on 'Economics and Knowledge'.
In 'Economics and Knowledge', Hayek argues that there is a certain (intentional) ambiguity in the title of his article, since one could expect two very different questions to be discussed. The title could suggest that the article is about the role assumptions an actor's knowledge may have in economic theory. But the title could just as well suggest a discussion about whether formal economic analysis conveys knowledge of what happens in the real world. However, for Hayek there is quite a clear connection between these two knowledge problems:
Indeed, my main contention will be that the tautologies, of which formal equilibrium analysis in economics essentially consists, can be turned into propositions which tell us anything about causation in the real world only in so far as we are able to fill those formal propositions with definite statements about how knowledge is acquired and communicated (1937: 33).
It was during the 1930s and 1940s that the economic profession came to the conclusion that it was necessary to make a clear separation between models that study the existence of an equilibrium, on the one hand, and stability models that study the adjustment process explaining how an equilibrium was or could be reached, on the other. According to Hayek, models of the existence of an equilibrium showing the compatibility of a set of individual plans were a purely logical exercise without any empirical content. These models consisted only of tautologies and belonged to what Hayek called the 'logic of choice'. But why should economists spend time studying/constructing such models if they have no empirical content? A general equilibrium theorist such as Frank Hahn (1973) has argued that the study of equilibrium states can only be justified on the basis of what he calls a weak causal claim. According to this claim, we can only justify the study of a specific equilibrium state under the condition that if the system starts out from some arbitrary position and settles down it will in fact end up in the equilibrium state studied by the economist. It is this weak causal claim that should legitimize the resources spent on the study of equilibrium states, securing a very weak and fragile correspondence between our model and reality. While Hahn seemed to have been indifferent to the specific mechanism/process that would produce the equilibrium state, Hayek argued that equilibrium theorists had to specify a mechanism that could explain and make intelligible how the equilibrium could emerge and how individual decision-makers could obtain the knowledge that was necessary in order to reach this equilibrium state:
The statement that, if people know everything, they are in equilibrium is true simply because that is how we define equilibrium. The assumption of a perfect market in that sense is just another way of saying that equilibrium exists, but does not get us any nearer an explanation of when and how such a state will come about. It is clear that if we want to make the assertion that under certain conditions people will approach the state we must explain by what process they will acquire the necessary knowledge (1937: 45, my italics).
That is, if we want our equilibrium model to be more than a formal model and have some empirical content, we have to specify the learning processes by which agents acquire the necessary knowledge to reach their 'equilibrium choices'. Such processes will of course always be of a hypothetical nature. But this does not mean that any assumption will do. In some cases, we may find out that there are no feasible processes that will produce the equilibrium in our formal model. In other cases we may try to find out which of several mechanisms gives the best explanation of how an equilibrium is reached and therefore has the highest truth-value.
Note that economists make use of two models. First, they start out constructing a static equilibrium model that describes a state or an outcome that a system may end up in. Such models are without 'empirical content', since they contain no causal statements about how the equilibrium is reached, or, as Hayek remarks, these models 'leave out what is our main task to explain ' (1937: 91) . Second, economists construct what Hayek (1937) calls 'subsidiary hypotheses' or ad hoc models that should specify the process by which agents acquire the necessary information to reach the equilibrium. It is these ad hoc models that give the formal model an 'empirical' or a 'causal' content, since the ad hoc model specifies the process through which agents end up in the equilibrium outcome studied in the formal model -or, as Hayek remarks:
The important point of which economists frequently do not seem to be aware is that the nature of these [subsidiary or ad hoc] hypotheses is in many respects rather different from the more general assumptions from which Pure Logic of Choice starts (1937: 46) .
In addition to the point already made, that the ad hoc model is an attempt to explain the social processes whereby the agents reach an equilibrium and therefore are assertions about causal connections, Hayek argues that the 'supplementary hypotheses must of necessity be selective, that is, we must select from the infinite variety of possible situations such ideal types as for some reason we regard as specially relevant to conditions in the real world ' (1937: 47) . And it is exactly because we have to choose some specific hypotheses that the concept of 'perfect rationality' in formal models is replaced with a concept of 'imperfect rationality' in the subsidiary hypotheses. Hayek ends his article on 'Economics and Knowledge' by remarking that it is very much in accordance with Alfred Schutz's idea that scientific models build on our common-sense understanding of the world that he had studied the 'knowledge problem' in economic models: 'All I have tried to do has been to find the way back to the common-sense meaning of our analysis, of which, I am afraid, we are likely to lose sight as our analysis becomes more elaborate ' (1937: 56) .
In 1936, Hayek presented an early version of his 'Economics and Knowledge' article at the Gesellschaft fu¨r Wirtschaftswissenschaft in Vienna and Alfred Schutz was invited as a discussant, giving a paper entitled 'Nationalo¨konomie: Verhalten des Menchen im sozialen Leben'. 15 In his article, Schutz did not address in depth the foundational issues taken up by Hayek, but used the opportunity to discuss his methodological approach in relation to economics. Hayek later requested a copy of the article that he wanted to have translated into English and published in Economica. However, for some unknown reason, Schutz never sent the finished manuscript to Hayek.
Many years later, in his 1953 article 'Common-sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action', Schutz referred to Hayek's 1937 article and his comments on the division of knowledge in society: 16 With the exception of some economists (e.g. F.A. Hayek, 'Economics and Knowledge') the problem of social distribution of knowledge has not attracted the attention of the social scientists it merits. It opens a new field for theoretical and empirical research, which truly deserves the name of sociology of knowledge. . . . It may be hoped that the systematic investigation of this field will yield significant contributions to many problems of organizational behavior, of sociology of occupations and professions, of prestige and status, etc. (1953/1962: 15 Hayek's 1937 article 'Economics and Knowledge' was the start of his 'transformation' from a rather narrow economist interested mainly in technical questions to a much broader economistphilosopher interested in all kinds of social issues. This qualifies Hayek's later writing on rule-following behavior, imperfect rationality, institutions, market processes as processes of discovery, constitutional issues, complexity, tacit knowledge, and so on. One way of describing Hayek's transformation is to argue that before he initiated the analysis of the 'knowledge problem' in economics, he had mainly been studying and building 'formal models' taking a 'Pure Logic of Choice' as his point of departure. After his 1937 article, Hayek realized how important learning processes were for equilibrium economics and commenced work on expanding what he, with so many other technical economists, had just regarded as 'subsidiary hypotheses', since their function was to motivate the formal equilibrium model by telling a reasonable story of how equilibrium was reached.
Hayek's change of priorities from building formal models to developing a new theoretical framework, by expanding upon the 'subsidiary hypothesis' of equilibrium economics, was mainly motivated by his conviction that only the 'subsidiary assumptions' and not the 'formal model' had empirical content. While most economists never took the 'subsidiary hypotheses' very seriously and only saw them as a kind of ad hoc defense of the equilibrium model, Hayek reversed this choice after his transformation. From then on, he began to build an empirical theory based on an evolutionaryinstitutional framework that did not assume that economic agents had more knowledge than they actually could obtain. Or, in more general philosophical terms, Hayek (1973) wanted to replace the 'Cartesian constructivist' view of orthodox economics with the 'evolutionary rationalist' position of classical liberalists such as Adam Smith and David Hume.
Schutz, Morgenstern and the 'Knowledge Problem' in Game Theory
Before the publication of the essay 'Economics and Knowledge', another Austrian economist, Oskar Morgenstern, published an article in 1935, 'Volkommene Voraussicht und wirtschaftliches Gleichgewicht', which was perhaps even more 'radical' in its implications than Hayek's article.
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Agents taken separately may be able to base their decision on rational beliefs. However, in an interdependent social system, it is impossible for all agents to justify their beliefs as rational at the same time, since it is illegitimate to generalize from the premise that 'it is possible for each agent to form rational beliefs separately' to the conclusion that 'it is possible for all agents to form such beliefs at the same time'. This was Oskar Morgenstern's basic argument in the 1935 article in which he was interested in paradoxes arising in equilibrium theories that relied on the assumption of perfect foresight. Applied to a single agent, the assumption of perfect foresight might seem reasonable enough. However, where the objective is to justify how several agents simultaneously might come to possess such knowledge, a number of conceptual problems arise: How can several agents in an interactive environment simultaneously form beliefs about each other's decisions rationally and consciously? Because of the self-reference problem involved, it is impossible to specify such a procedure by which agents can justify their beliefs as fully rational. In the simple case of only two agents, this implies that the first agent must be acquainted with the knowledge of the other agent, since the future partly depends on his actions. But part of this second agent's knowledge will consist of what he knows about the first agent's knowledge and so on ad infinitum. This self-reference problem leads to an infinite regression which according to Oskar Morgenstern (1935 makes it impossible for the agents involved to justify their beliefs as perfectly rational:
There is exhibited an endless chain of reciprocally conjectural reactions and counter-reactions. This chain can never be broken by an act of knowledge but always only through an arbitrary act -a resolution. This resolution, again, would have to be foreseen by the two or more persons concerned. The paradox still remains no matter how one attempts to twist or turn things around. Perfect foresight and economic equilibrium are thus irreconcilable with one another (1953/1976, p. 174, my italics) .
The demand for consistency proves to be irreconcilable with the demand for perfection: In order to explain the emergence of equilibrium, the concept of perfect rationality must be abandoned or the theoretical possibility of disequilibrium and the relevance of the adjustment problem must be completely refuted at the expense of the explanatory content of the model. In terms of Mu¨nchhausen's trilemma this means either, we end up in an infinite regress, which is either never interrupted or which is interrupted at an arbitrary level, or we end up in a vicious circle taking for granted what we were to prove. In neither of these cases will the agents be able to justify their beliefs as perfectly rational.
It was partly due to some of these conceptual problems in the theory of perfect competition -as spelled out by both Hayek (1937) and Morgenstern (1928 Morgenstern ( , 1935 Morgenstern ( /1976 ) -that the plan to construct a new theory of strategic choice/game theory emerged. According to Oskar Morgenstern (1977) , the 1935 article was the direct cause for his subsequent cooperation with John von Neuman. After having presented his ideas to the Vienna Circle, invited by Moritz Schlick, Morgenstern was also later asked to present his article at the Karl Menger Colloquium. Following this presentation, the mathematician Eduard Cech pointed out to Morgenstern that several of the issues he had raised were identical to those discussed by John von Neuman in an article entitled 'Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele' that had been published in 1928. However, Morgenstern and von Neuman did not meet until several years later in 1938, after Morgenstern had immigrated to the USA because of the Nazi occupation of Austria. Morgenstern was of course fully aware of his own rather limited mathematical knowledge and of the genius of John von Neumann.
18 However, as stated by Andrew Schotter (1992), Morgenstern's role in the creation of 'The Theory of Games' was to make John von Neumann aware of the existing problems/anomalies within economic theory (especially the paradox of the assumption of perfect foresight) and how a theory of games may contribute to a solution to this problem. According to Schotter, only an unorthodox economist such as Morgenstern could fulfill this role:
Despite von Neumann's technical powers, the course of economics was changed by Morgenstern's focusing attention on a mode of analysis that has only recently come to be dominant mode for all economics. The theory of games needed a nonneoclassical leader since it represented a fundamental break in economic thinking that would have been ruined if placed in the hands of a more conventional mind. I can think of no other economist at the time who could have walked into a room with John von Neumann and walked out later with a 600-page book on the theory of games complete with economic examples. That fact speaks for itself (1992: 111).
Another game theorist, Martin Shubik attributed an almost similar role in the creation of game theory to Morgenstern:
One of the great virtues of Oskar Morgenstern was that he understood the significance of the theory of games. He was not a mathematician and on some occasions may not even have understood some of the work he espoused. But he was clearly aware of many of the big problems in economics and was energetic enough and visionary enough that he tried to do something about them even if he could not solve them himself. Thus, in particular, he recognized 'perfect foresight' as a beˆte noire, and much of his concern for the development of the theory of games was to get rid of the paradox of perfect foresight ' (1992: 160) .
Game theory was from Morgenstern's point of view thought of as a way to go beyond the problem of how agents in an economy of interdependent decision-makers can have perfect foresight about each other's actions, without ending up in an infinite regression, because each decision-maker forms more and more complex expectations about each other's behavior. 19 It was probably in order to avoid this infinite regression that von Neuman and Morgenstern (1944) proposed 'mini-max' as a behavioral strategy, where the player is guaranteed a certain minimum outcome independently of the strategy choices of the other players.
Although Morgenstern's involvement in the construction of game theory in the 1940s seems to have been strongly inspired by the discussions on the 'knowledge problem' from the von Mises' seminar during the late 1920s and early 1930s, Schutz and Morgenstern seem not to have been in direct contact with each other during the 1940s. However, Schutz was quite aware both of Morgenstern's involvement in the 'game theoretic revolution' and of the fact that game theory was in some -yet unclear -way related to the 'knowledge problem' of the Austrian School. 20 An important reason why this was unclear was due to the implicit assumptions that game theorists used at that time regarding what knowledge players had regarding other players' knowledge, etc. in a game. That is, the general assumption of 'common knowledge' and the specific assumption of 'common knowledge of rationality' that have been discussed so much during the 1990s had not yet been specified. In fact, the concept of common knowledge in game theory was first introduced in 1969 by the philosopher David Lewis in his book Conventions: A Philosophical Study, and first later adopted by game theorists from 1976 and onwards.
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In his important article 'Common-sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action', Schutz (1953 Schutz ( /1962 ) demonstrated a high awareness that it was the scientist that gave his individual homunculi knowledge about their situation and about the knowledge of other homunculi. In a correspondence with Schutz dated 4 April 1952, the phenomenologist, Aron Gurwitsch wrote that Schutz, in the article quoted above, was not quite clear about what knowledge/ beliefs he assumed each player had about the other players' knowledge/beliefs:
In spite of repeated readings I consistently fail to understand your discussion of rationality at one point. . . . Mustn't one make a distinction between the knowledge the homunculus has, a knowledge by the grace of the scientist, and the knowledge of the scientist himself? The scientist knows what he has conferred upon the homunculus A and upon his partner B (also a homunculus). But what does A know about B's knowledge? At any rate, A doesn't know what the scientist has conferred upon B. Thus, if the scientist has conferred rationality upon A and B, does A know that B has acted in a fully rational manner? (Aron Gurwitsch 1952: 173) .
These remarks indicate that Gurwitsch was aware of the importance of making explicit the knowledge or belief-systems that actors were assumed to have about each other and each other's belief-system, etc., in order to be able to define what a rational choice was. Specifying the assumptions of knowledge/beliefs of the agents was not just important in defining an equilibrium position for a system of interdependent decision-makers. According to Morgenstern, it was even more important when trying to specify a causal mechanism that could explain how the equilibrium could have emerged in the first place. As is clear from his question, Gurwitsch did not foresee the notion of 'common knowledge of rationality', but his last question may (but need not) be interpreted as if he was aware of the problem of Morgenstern (1935 Morgenstern ( /1976 ) that if we give the agents too much knowledge the whole system may be 'over determined' and it becomes impossible to understand how an equilibrium could emerge.
In his answer (dated 20 April 1952) to Gurwitsch, Schutz gives the following answer:
You ask if one mustn't make a distinction between the knowledge which the homunculus has, which is a knowledge by the grace of the scientist, and the knowledge of the scientist himself. Of course one has to make such a distinction. The scientist, and he alone, determines what homunculus A and what homunculus B know and can know. You ask: but what does homunculus A know about what the scientist has given his partner B, who is also a homunculus? I doubt that this question is really legitimate. In the final analysis, A doesn't know anything at all. It neither knows anything about itself nor anything about B, unless the scientist has constructed his consciousness such that A's knowledge also include B's knowledge. But if this is the case, then I don't really see any problem in the fact that the scientist also gives A the knowledge that homunculus B acts rationally.
In this answer, Alfred Schutz seems to come very close to anticipating the concept of 'common knowledge' and especially the assumption of 'common knowledge of rationality' in modern game theory. A fact x is said to be common knowledge to players A and B, if 'A knows x', 'B knows that A knows x' and 'A knows that B knows that A knows x', etc., ad infinitum. 'Common knowledge of rationality' will exist if the following propositions are true 'A is rational', 'B knows that A is rational', 'A knows that B knows that A is rational', 'B knows that A knows that B knows that A is rational', and so on ad infinitum. The lesson from the development of game theory is that many of the information assumptions that game theorists had been using in order to define equilibrium were in fact never stated explicitly. For instance, in order to define a Nash equilibrium, game theorists had relied on but not stated the assumptions that 1) the strategies of the players and the structure of the game were common knowledge and 2) that the rationality of the players was common knowledge.
But the question that Hayek and Morgenstern, and also Gurwitsch, seemed to have been asking in their analysis of the 'problem of knowledge' was this: Can social scientists (game theorists) endow their homunculi (players) with whatever knowledge they wish? From his answer to Gurwitsch it seems probable that Schutz would have given a positive answer to this question. Hayek, Morgenstern, and Gurwitsch, on the other hand, would have given a negative answer to this question, arguing that if we only study a single economic agent, it will be legitimate to endow him with whatever knowledge we want. However, when we go from studying one agent to two or more agents (or any kind of systems with interdependent agents), our analysis will take on a qualitative new dimension. Since we now have to endow our agents with knowledge or beliefs about other agents' knowledge or beliefs, we may end up assuming that agents have more knowledge about each other than it is feasible for them to acquire. That is, we may end up having an 'over-determined system' that shows the impossibility of converging towards an equilibrium outcome. This implies that if we want to explain how a Nash equilibrium may emerge 22 we have to assume -in accordance with the Morgenstern thesis -that the players have less than perfect knowledge or less than common knowledge of rationality. (Blaug, 1980) . This defense was to a high degree inspired by Schutz and Kaufmann. 25 After the disbandment of the Mises group in 1934, both Schutz and Machlup emigrated to the US. While Schutz came to New York and got a position at the New School of Social Research (like Felix Kaufmann), Fritz Machlup got his first position at the University of Buffalo, NY, and went on to Johns Hopkins University. Later he moved to Princeton before finally coming to New York University for his retirement.
The methodological debate in economics in the 1920s and 1930s had mainly been a debate between the radical a priorism of von Mises and the ultra-empiricism of T. W. Hutchison (1938) . In the same way as Schutz had argued for the necessity of finding a third alternative based on Felix Kaufmann's conventionalist methodology, Fritz Machlup argued, Writers on the one side of this contend that economic science is a system of a priori truths, a product of pure reason, an exact science reaching laws as universal as those of mathematics, a purely axiomatic discipline, a system of pure deductions from a series of postulate, not open to any verifications or refutation on the ground of experience (1955: 5).
Opposed to these tenets are the ultra-empiricists . . . [they] reject the basic assumptions of economic theory because they are not independently verified, and reject any theoretical system that is built on unverified or unverifiable assumptions (1955: 8).
The philosopher Felix Kaufmann introduced as a middle category the so-called 'rules of procedures', which, according to Machlup, are neither synthetic in the sense that they are falsifiable by contravening observations nor a priori in the sense that they are independent of experience; they are and remain accepted as long as they have heuristic value, but will be rejected in favor of other rules (assumptions) which seem to serve their explanatory functions more successfully (1955: 16).
It was this conventionalist methodology of Felix Kaufmann that, along with Alfred Schutz's view on ideal types in the social sciences, fundamentally shaped Fritz Machlup's view on the methodological foundation of orthodox microeconomic theory and his construction of its 'classical defense' in the 1950s. 26 Though being one of the main contenders in the Marginalist Controversy in the 1940s, 27 it was first in 1955 that Fritz Machlup (partly influenced by Milton Friedman's 1953 paper on 'The Methodology of Positive Economics') was able to give a more coherent methodological formulation of his position in a 1955 article on 'The Verification Problem in Economics'. According to F. Machlup (1955) , orthodox microeconomic theory should be seen as a 'machine', an 'apparatus', or an 'engine of analysis' ((1955) p. 12) that like the 'covering law model' consists of an explanans (the various assumptions used in a model to explain) as well as an explanandum (the implications/comparative static results that can be derived from the model). In the same way as an 'engine' or a 'machine' consists of fixed and variable/replaceable parts, the explanans of a microeconomic model consists of a fixed part: 'the assumed type of action' (the fundamental postulate) and some variable/replaceable parts: 'assumed conditions' that specify what type of economy, setting, and case the decision-maker is confronted with, including the 'type of information' he or she has access to when taking decisions. Re 1. In accordance with a conventionalist methodology, the 'fundamental postulate' (the maximization hypothesis) should be regarded as an indirectly testable postulate within a covering-law model. That is, the 'fundamental assumption' should never be tested directly, but only be appraised indirectly on the basis of a test of the 'implications' that can be deduced from the whole set of assumptions in the model. 29 Consequently, Machlup (1955) argues that seeing them as 'heuristic mental principles', 'useful fictions' or 'definitional assumptions' or 'procedural rules', better conveys the methodological status of the 'fundamental assumptions'. This implies that the assumptions themselves are not intended as an explanation of empirical phenomena, but rather viewed as a useful instrument for deducing predictions. However, Machlup (1955) supplemented this purely conventionalist position by adding Schutz's two requirements of 'subjective interpretation' and of 'adequacy', implying that all types of action are used in the abstract models constructed for purposes of analysis be understandable to most of us in the sense that we could conceive of sensible men acting (sometimes at least) in the way postulated by the ideal type in question (1955: 17) . 30 Re 2. But how should we appraise an 'engine of analysis' such as orthodox microeconomic theory? As we have just seen, Machlup rejects the idea that we should be able to appraise microeconomic theory by conducting a direct test of the assumed type of action and the assumed type of conditions. What he suggests instead is that we test the assumptions in a theory by testing the implications that can be deduced from the theory.
31 By performing an 'indirect test' we should be able to find out if the whole configuration of assumptions in a specific microeconomic model is adequate for explaining/predicting certain empirical phenomena or not. Or, as Machlup states, 'the conjunction of logically independent propositions and derivation of their joint consequences is the essence of indirect testing ' (1956: 484) . That is, we test the (totality of ) assumptions by testing the implications that can be deduced from the theory. 32 In orthodox microeconomic theory these 'implications' consist, according to Machlup, of comparative static results that take the following form: If we change a parameter/exogenous variable ('disequilibrating variation'), what will then happen to an endogenous variable ('equilibrating variation')?
Re 3. What is the proper boundary/domain of orthodox microeconomics? In a long series of papers stretching from the mid1930s to the mid-1970s, Fritz Machlup (1936 Machlup ( , 1946 Machlup ( , 1952 Machlup ( , 1955 Machlup ( , 1967 Machlup ( , and 1974 has used Alfred Schutz's discussion of a scale of different ideal types ranging from the most concrete to the most anonymous in order to define the proper domain of microeconomic theory. Machlup states, Where thousands or even only hundreds of firms sell in the same market, we are usually able to do with much less information than if only a few sellers share the market. In the analysis of mass action, where each individual actor counts only a little, we need not know them intimately in order to explain the combined results. A very 'anonymous' model (or ideal type) of the relevant kind of actor will suffice for an explanation of the process in question and its outcome. Not so when only a few people are involved; where each individual actor counts heavily, a much more intimate knowledge about every one of them may be needed for an explanation of the combined results (1952: 18-19). This implies, according to Machlup, that orthodox 'profit maximization' theory is in fact not a 'theory of the firm', but rather a 'theory of markets' or a 'theory of industries' in which we try to explain and predict changes in prices as effects of changes in the conditions of a large group of firms: 'In this causal connection the firm is only a theoretical link, a mental construct helping to explain how one gets from the cause to the effects ' (1967: 9) . Two interesting implications follow from this specification of the domain of orthodox theory. First, if the level of analysis (explanandum) in the orthodox theory is not the individual firm, but rather what happens on the industry level, the orthodox (marginalist) theory and the behavioralist theory of Cyert and March (1963) are not really competitors since they try to solve different problems. 33 Second, Machlup ends up with a very restricted definition of economics that only includes the theory of perfect competition, but excludes theories of monopoly and oligopoly. The argument is that in the theory of perfect competition we can rely on a very anonymous ideal type to explain and predict behavior, while in theories dealing with 'small number exchange' we cannot get any deterministic solution without making specific (and Machlup would add) 'non-economic' assumptions about what type of agent we are dealing with. In the theory of oligopoly (at least before the emergence of game theory) it was very difficult or even impossible due to problems of infinite regression to find any deterministic solution without taking the psychology of the players into account, thereby introducing less than fully anonymous ideal types. The strength of orthodox economics consists therefore in modeling what Leif Johansen (1980) has called an 'indirect, parametric and unconscious' type of interaction (as in the theory of perfect competition), while other and more direct types of interaction, according to Machlup (1967) , may be left to behavioral and other social researchers.
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In a series of articles, Langlois (1986) , Koppl (2002) , and Langlois and Koppl (1985) have argued that Machlup's restriction on the domain of economics, to include only very general and anonymous types, corresponds to what is described as 'situations with a very tight system constraint'. That is, like Armen Alchian, Langlois and Koppl (1985) assume that economists do not necessarily have to assume maximizing agents with full information, since there exist 'an alternative method which treats the decisions and criteria dictated by the economic system as more important than those made by the individuals in it ' (1950: 19) . 35 By assuming that the market functions like a 'selection mechanism' we may in fact get results that look as if such foresight had been present. 36 Langlois then connects Machlup's discussion of general and anonymous types with Alchian's selection argument in the following way:
[T]he tighter the constraint, the less we have to worry about the informational demands placed on the agent and about the internal details of his psychology. Thus, like Alchian, Machlup is saying that the supposed failure of the businessman to perform explicit Marshallian cost calculations does not invalidate the results of the theory because (in some sense) the system as a whole obviates such conscious rationality (1986: 240-1).
That is, we may have very different and even inconsistent theoretical accounts (rule-following behavior and market selection) that lead to the same conclusions. Consequently, we will be unable to select between such observationally equivalent theories by conducting any indirect tests, but some kind of second-order criterion has to be brought in if we want to be able to choose between such theories. It was this argument of under-determination that later on was used by Milton Friedman (1953) and later again by Robert Lucas (1986) to defend different versions of the standard 'maximization-cumequilibrium' framework of orthodox theory.
Explaining the Different Research Strategies of Austrian Economists
After having presented the views of Mises, Hayek, Morgenstern, Machlup, and Schutz, it is now quite obvious that they came to radically different positions regarding orthodox economic theory. While Machlup and to some extent Schutz formulated the socalled 'classical defense' of orthodox economics, Hayek and Morgenstern were both critical towards orthodox economics, while Mises took a more neutral stance. Langlois has argued, Thus was Hayek led by his concern with knowledge to abandon conventional static micro-theory in favor of such heterodox concerns as expectations, disequilibrium, and process-theory -ideas that are characteristic of what has come to be called the modern Austrian School. Moreover, we can find in Hayek ideas that parallel and anticipate many of the concerns of, say, Herbert Simon. The result is that Hayek's journey from Mises and Vienna ended up in a position almost diametrically opposed in many ways to that of Machlup, who was always in the forefront of opposition to heterodox attacks on conventional micro-theory, especially those from Simonian and related perspectives (1985: 229) .
But how can we explain the very different views regarding mainstream neoclassical economics among the members of the von Mises seminar group and the resulting 'inner tension' within the Austrian School to economic modeling? In the following section I take my point of departure in Winter's (1964 Winter's ( , 1975 Winter's ( , and 1986a ), Nelson's (1986) and Nelson and Winter's (1982, Chs 4-6) distinction between formal and appreciative theory and show how the different (Austrian) theorists have made different priorities between these two types of theorizing depending upon whether they view theories from an instrumentalist-conventionalist or a realist point of view.
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Formal models in economics often start from the assumption that observed phenomena should be viewed as equilibrium configurations resulting from the interaction of maximizing agents. At first, this may sound like an explanation of how an equilibrium configuration comes about, but it is not. As both Hayek (1937) and Morgenstern (1935 Morgenstern ( /1976 ) argued, maximization is only a welldefined concept in equilibrium, it tells us nothing about how agents go about making choices outside equilibrium and it does not improve our understanding of how agents may converge towards an equilibrium state. Similarly, in comparative static models, one just compares two equilibria, without explaining how one gets from the old equilibrium to the new one. When the old equilibrium is disturbed it is just assumed that one ends up in a new equilibrium and that the time out of equilibrium is relatively short. Since formal models are without 'empirical' and/or 'causal content', economists often make use of some kind of 'storytelling' -or what Nelson and Winter (1982) call 'appreciative theorizing' -in order to give some rough idea of how the equilibrium outcome studied in the formal model may have been reached. However, this kind of 'storytelling' is in most cases not integrated, but tacked onto the formal model and is therefore just an ad hoc construction.
One of the best examples of how formal modeling is 'interpreted' and 'defended' through the use of 'appreciative theorizing' is exactly the classical defense of the profit maximization hypothesis put forward by Milton Friedman (1953) and Fritz Machlup (1946 Machlup ( , 1955 Machlup ( , and 1967 ). Friedman built his defense of the profit maximization hypothesis on Alchian's 'selection argument':
Let the apparent immediate determinant of business behavior be anything at all . . . habitual reaction, random chance, or whatnot. Whenever this determinant happens to lead to behavior consistent with the rational and maximization of returns, the business will prosper and acquire resources with which to expand, whenever it does not, the business will tend to lose resources and can be kept in existence only by the addition of resources from outside. The process of 'natural selection' thus helps to validate the 'maximization of returns' hypothesis . . . or rather, given natural selection, acceptance of the hypothesis can be based largely on the judgment that it summarizes appropriately the conditions for survival (1953: 32, my emphasis).
According to this (under-determination) argument, the behavior of firms can be 'explained' with the help of at least two inconsistent theories or mechanisms that we may denote as T1 and T2. T1 stands for the 'orthodox' maximization approach and is the formal model, where the firm is assumed to consciously appraise different courses of action, and choose the alternative with the best consequences, according to the criteria of profitability. In the alternative and appreciative theory T2, the firms are assumed to be 'rule-followers' and the market is assumed to function as a selection mechanism selecting firms that have picked rules that happen to lead to profit-maximization consequences. The selection argument then leads Friedman to suggest that the assumptions in economic theory should never be interpreted literally, but always enclosed in an 'as if ' clause. In accordance with this 'as if ' principle, Machlup (1946) argued that the maximization assumption in standard microeconomic programs should not be interpreted too literally. While many critics of the marginal approach, such as Hall and Hitch (1939) , had argued that decision-makers came to a decision by applying rules of thumb and other types of rules, Machlup argued that:
Businessmen do not always 'calculate' before they make decisions, and they do not always 'decide' before they act. For they think that they know their business well enough without having to make repeated calculations; and their actions are frequently routine. But routine is based on principles which were once considered and decided upon and have frequently applied with decreasing need for conscious choices. The feeling that calculations are not always necessary is usually based upon an ability to size up a situation without reducing its dimensions to definite numerical values (1946: 524-5). This argument seems to have been influenced by Schutz's view of how people make choices in their everyday lives. According to Schutz, everyday behavior shows all the signs of habituality, automatism, and half-consciousness that Machlup refers to above:
As we normally have to act and not to reflect, in order to satisfy the demands of the moment, which it is our task to master, we are not interested in the 'quest for certainty'. We are satisfied if we have a fair chance of realizing our purposes, and this chance, so we like to think, we have if we set in motion the same mechanism of habits, rules and principles which formerly stood the test and which still stand the test (1964: 73) .
But what role does the appreciative model T2 have in the 'classical defense' of orthodox theory? In the instrumentalist-conventionalist account of Friedman and Machlup the sole purpose of T2 is to legitimize the use of the maximization assumption in T1. 38 The 'realistic' and closer to 'common sense' assumption used in T2 is therefore just a way of defending the 'unrealistic' and 'abstract' assumptions used in the 'formal model' T1. But as soon as the appreciative theory T2 has served this justificatory purpose, there is no further need of this behavioral-evolutionary story based on habits, rules, routines, and market selection.
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The interesting dilemma is whether we should use the appreciative theory T2, i.e. the story of habits, rules, and routines to build an ad hoc 'defense' for the neo-classical research program, as argued by Machlup and Schutz, or whether we should use these arguments as the foundation for building an alternative evolutionaryinstitutional program, as argued by Hayek and Morgenstern. This second research strategy implies following a realist methodology that consists in turning upside down Friedman's and Machlup's classical defense of the orthodox framework: If profit maximization, as argued by Friedman (1953) and Machlup (1955) , is just a rough approximation schema to a more complex, but also a truer representation of the world described by rule-following behavior and market selection, we should take the latter set of assumptions and not the 'maximization-cum-equilibrium' framework, as the foundation for our future theorizing. 40 What I am suggesting here is that Hayek and to some degree Morgenstern proposed a similar realist research strategy as the one Sidney Winter (1964 Winter ( , 1975 made use of when he, first alone and later in cooperation with Richard Nelson (1982) 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. 41 Where Friedman and Machlup had developed an appreciative theory T2 just to defend the formal model T1, Nelson and Winter's (1982) ambition was to build a new evolutionary theory directly upon the 'classical defense' of Friedman and Machlup or T2. Nelson (1986) argued, [A] lack of consonance between appreciative theorizing and formal theorizing is an indication that the attempt at understanding is foundering. Appreciative stories, not sharpened by formal models that are consonant with them, can't carry us very far. . . . Neat formal models that don't capture the core of plausible stories are at best unpersuasive (1986, p. 136 ).
Based on this philosophy of what fruitful theorizing is, Nelson and Winter (1982) built a new formal evolutionary research program taking their inspiration in Friedman's and Machlup's classical defense. But in opposition to Friedman and Machlup, Nelson and Winter (1982) made routine behavior, bounded rationality, market selection, and the process perspective the core elements of their new formal research program rather than just leaving these building blocks as an ad hoc defense of orthodox theory that was not supposed to undergo any further theoretical development. In fact, Nelson and Winter's (1982) insistence on building their formal theories upon the existing appreciative theory T2 could, in fact, be interpreted as an attempt to fulfill Schutz's principle of adequacy in order to secure some correspondence between our common sense experience and the constructs of the social scientist.
42
Let us finally try to confront Hayek's more critical point of view on orthodox theory with Machlup's apologetic stance in order to understand the theoretical implications of an instrumentalistconventionalist versus a realist research strategy. In his specification of what is the domain of economics, Machlup (1974: 276) argued that economics is only interested in explaining and predicting the 'reactions' rather than the 'actions' of economic actors, the 'effects of these reactions' rather than 'ascertain the reactions of millions of people' and finally to explain and predict not the 'effects of particular persons', but the 'effects of mass reactions' by only studying very anonymous ideal types. But putting such restrictions on the boundary of economics leads to some deep-seated problems of 'understandability'. Studying a social system where it is assumed that all agents are conceptualized as 'reactors to changes in condition' immediately leads to the explanatory question of how the endogenous variables in such a system have been determined. If everyone is just reacting to changes in conditions such as relative prices, there is, following Arrow (1959) , no one left over in this system to make a decision on prices and therefore no price-changing agent. Or formulated in realist terms, there is no 'causal power' attributed to a single economic agent that can explain how 'change' emerges in such an economic system. 43 This problem seems to be common to all theories that study indirect, parametric, and unconscious interaction. In this type of interaction, we try to solve the coordination problem by splitting it into a problem of existence that is a purely logical exercise and a problem of adjustment or a problem of stability that tries to give some 'causal account' of how the equilibrium can be reached. However, keeping these two exercises completely separate -instead of trying to integrate them -implies that processes will always be treated in an ad hoc and anomalous way in economics. 44 In fact, the very separation of having a formal model and an appreciative theory (i.e. a story to defend the formal model) seems to be implied by this separation. It was exactly in order to overcome the ad hoc treatment of processes in these models that modern Austrian economists have tried to introduce genuine change-oriented explanations such as 'market process models'. 45 The ambition behind these models has been to integrate processes directly in the central part of the explanation, i.e. the model of the agent by replacing the 'static' maximization assumption with a more process or procedural type of rationality. 
Implications for Economic Modeling
Twenty-one years after the 'Marginalist Controversy' in the American Economic Review between Fritz Machlup and Richard Lester, Machlup sets out to reflect on the debate. In this connection, he referred to a rumor by stating that 'Machlup won the battle but Lester won the war ' (1967: 2) . One way of interpreting this statement is to argue that Machlup with his much broader knowledge of the methodology of economics managed to defend the marginalist tradition against Lester's specific attack. However, to win a single battle is not the same as winning the war. Seen from today's perspective, one could make the case that Machlup was in fact unable to defend the 'marginalist' tradition and therefore lost the war. 47 The development in the last century with the emphasis on market process theory in the Austrian tradition, but also the emergence of heterodox traditions such as evolutionary and neo-institutional economics and the emergence of game theory as the new orthodoxy with its much more liberal attitude towards economic modeling than the 'marginalists', confirm that the field has become more sensitive to studying processes rather than equilibrium outcomes and broadened its concept of rationality. In short, the field has moved away from the Machlup-Schutz position and towards a Hayek-Morgenstern position. But what are the broader theoretical implications in terms of economic modeling of taking a realist rather than an instrumentalistconventionalist stance in terms of methodology? Instead of focusing on the outcome of social processes as we do in equilibrium economics, we should focus on the individual details of the adjustment process or the change process per se. And instead of handling the problems of economic processes in separate ad hoc constructions outside the formal models (as we do in the 'selection argument' and in the Walras 'auctioneer' construction, etc.), these 'process accounts' should be incorporated in the formal models in the sense that we should try to model how individual decision-makers handle disequilibrium situations through different learning strategies and by modeling the thinking processes of the agents explicitly. Furthermore, assumptions about perfect and fully articulate knowledge are consequently replaced with assumptions of imperfect and tacit knowledge. And when it is recognized that knowledge is not something given, but something that must be acquired, Hayek's themes on the distribution and development of knowledge in the economy become important issues in the field. That leads again to the question of the compatibility of process and equilibrium in economic modeling. Furthermore, the maximization principle as a concept of substantive rationality is replaced with a procedural concept of rationality in which rule-following behavior takes center stage. Finally, the 'closed world' ontology assumed in orthodox economics is replaced with an 'open world' ontology that allows for the emergence of 'novelties'. Within Austrian economics it has, for instance, been suggested that market processes should be studied as either processes of discoveries (Hayek 1978 and Kirzner 1985) or as constructive processes (Buchanan and Vanberg 1991) .
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1. According to Machlup (1969) , Alfred Schutz gave the philosopher of law, Hans Kelsen, credit for this idea. 2. A high degree of anonymity will in modern terminology correspond to situations where we deem it appropriate to use 'black box' descriptions of another actor. 3. Cf. Sheamur (1993) . 4. For a critique of Schutz's 'dual vision' of subjectivism and objectivism, cf. R. A. Gorman (1977) . 5. See, however, R. Koppl (2002) . 6. R. N. Langlois argues that: 'The idea of a representative agent fits in with the notion of the ideal type in the Weber-Schutz tradition. Because the object of our study is not agents for their own sakes but agents only as links in an explanatory chain, we need to abstract from real individuals to create artificial individuals that nonetheless retain some of the typical features of real individuals' (1998: 59). 7. Cf. E. Mayr's (1976) distinction between typologic and population thinking.
Though Langlois' argument that 'typification does not commit one to the assumption that all agents in the population are identical ' (1998: 59 ) is correct, it seems, however, that the 'principle of reciprocity of perspectives' and completely anonymous ideal type will lead to the result that all agents are treated as being identical. 8. Cf. the special issue on 'Alfred Schutz and the Economists' in The Review of Austrian Economics, Vol. 14 (2/3) edited by Peter Boetke and Roger Koppl (2001) . 9. See Kaufmann (1932 Kaufmann ( , 1933 , Stonier and Bode (1937) , and F. Machlup (1936) ). 10. Cf. Helling (1984) for the relationship between Kaufmann and Schutz. 11. For a presentation of this Aristotelian view of Carl Menger's approach to methodology, see Barry Smith (1994) . 12. Paul Samuelson raised such a concern explicitly from an ultra-empiricist position: 'Well in connection with the exaggerated claims that used to be made in economics for the power of deduction and a priori reasoning -by classical writers, by Carl Menger, by the 1932 Robbin by the disciples of Frank Knight, by Ludwig von Mises -I tremble for the reputation of my subject' (1952: 6) 13. Mises did not raise the second knowledge problem, i.e. the problem of coordinating the plans or expectations of the economic agents, explicitly as stated by Karen Vaughn: 'While the knowledge problem may be in Mises implicitly, it is not an explicit concern of his. One has to know the Mengerian tradition in advance in order to find it easily in Mises' (1991: 398) . 14. Hayek gives the following description of this transformation: 'Though at one time a very pure and narrow economic theorist, I was led from technical economics into all kinds of questions usually regarded as philosophical. When I look back, it seems to have all begun, nearly thirty years ago, with an essay on ''Economics and Knowledge '' ' (1964: 91) . For two different interpretations of this transformation see respectively, Caldwell (1988) and Hutchison (1992 Schutz (1996) . 16. Luckmann (1973, 1989) later addressed these problems more directly. 17. It was Frank Knight who translated this article into English. Morgenstern's interest in the knowledge problem as well as the problem of introducing the time element in economic models seems to have been strongly influenced by his participation in the seminar of Hans Mayer before becoming a member of the Mises seminar. Mayer (1932) was concerned with the causal process towards equilibrium and argued that it was necessary to explicate how the preferences and beliefs of the agents were linked to the market outcome. Mayer used the term 'genetic causation' for the type of explanation that he recommended to solve the adjustment problem. Cf. Robin Cowan (1994) . 18. Cf. R. J. Leonard (1995) for an interesting historical reconstruction of the creation of game theory. 19. But how should we expect 'game theory' to have looked if it had been constructed more in accordance with Morgenstern's than with von Neumann's priorities? One possibility is to refer to Morgenstern's pupil Andrew Schotter (1980) , who has used game theory in order to model Carl Menger's theory of how social institutions emerge as responses to different kinds of repeated social problems. 20. Modern Austrian economists who rely on Alfred Schutz are, according to Roger Koppl, confronted with the following paradox in applying game theory: 'Austrian economists generally make relatively little use of the mathematical theory of games, and yet this theory was addressed initially to precisely the most characteristically ''Austrian'' problems in economic theory ' (1994: 75) . The reason for this paradox was that game theory normally requires the theorist to use very anonymous types, but to apply them in 'small number' situations (typically oligopoly situations). 21. Cf. Aumann (1976) . 22. Very much like Hayek's (1937) argument in relation to the theory of perfect competition, Cristina Bicchieri has argued that the problem of how players obtain the correct beliefs towards reaching a Nash equilibrium is often neglected by game theorists: 'Game theorists typically assign predictive value to Nash equilibrium: the best available explanation of the achievement of a Nash equilibrium in a given case is that each of the players know what the other players are going to do. It is for this reason that theorists who predict that a Nash equilibrium will be achieved also assume that players know what other players will do. But notice that knowledge of what others will do is not implied by the definition of the Nash equilibrium. Therefore, one wishing to explain the occurrence of a Nash equilibrium does well to explain how those correct beliefs are arrived at in the first place ' (1993: 58) . 23. Cristina Bicchieri (1989) discusses various ways that game theorists use to solve extensive games such as backward induction. In accordance with Morgenstern's argument, she shows that in order to obtain the standard backward induction solution it is required that the players do not have full common knowledge of rationality. Making too strong information assumptions may therefore be counterproductive in terms of securing an equilibrium solution. 'Latsis distinguish three major methodologies of economic and social inquiries: apriorism, falsificationism, and conventionalism. He labels me as a conventionalist -in the sense of one who accepts as meaningful and useful basic propositions that make no assertions but are conventions (resolutions, postulates) with regard to analytic procedure. I accept this label ' (1978: 460) . 27. Cf. P. Mongin (1992) . 28. Machlup's distinctions between 'fixed' and 'replaceable' parts in an 'analytical engine' are more or less identical to the concepts of a 'hard core' and a 'protective belt' in Lakatos (1970) 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes'. Machlup (1955) argued that the 'fixed part' such as the 'maximization principle' is and 'remains accepted as long as they have heuristic value, but will be rejected in favor of other rules (assumptions) which seem to serve their explanatory functions more successfully'. This argument is very close to the Lakatosian view that it will be rational to go on solving problems in a research program as long as we are able to build a theoretically and empirically progressive series of theories around the 'hard core', while we have to reconsider the immunity of the 'hard core' when this series of theories starts to degenerate. The 'only difference' between them is that Lakatos managed to specify the concept of 'heuristic value' in Machlup's methodology by introducing the concept of 'theoretical and empirical progressiveness'. 29. In a similar fashion, the 'assumed type of conditions' should be selected on the basis of 'causal empiricism' rather than on any kind of direct test (cf. Sheamur (1993) . 31. In fact, Machlup (1955) argues that a theory is only scientific if we can deduce some 'implications' from it that are 'falsifiable'. In economics this implies that we should at least be able to deduce one 'qualitative comparative-static' proposition. When Machlup is very skeptical regarding the behavioral theory of the firm, it is mainly because we cannot deduce any 'falsifiable' implications from this theory. 32. In accordance with the Duhem-Quine thesis, Machlup accepts that it is impossible to identify which assumptions in a theory may be blamed if we have falsified the 'implications' deduced from a theory. 33. While Herbert Simon (1979) has been critical of Machlup's classical defense, because: 'acceptance of the narrow view that economics is concerned only with the aggregative phenomena of political economy defines away a whole rich domain of rational human behavior as inappropriate for economic research ' (1979, p. 495 ), Cyert and March seem to have accepted Machlup's view: 'Ultimately, a new theory of firm decision-making behavior might be used as a basis for a theory of markets, but at least in the short run we should distinguish between a theory of micro behavior, on the one hand, and the micro assumptions appropriate to a theory of aggregate economic behavior on the other hand. In the present volume we will argue that we have developed the rudiments of a reasonable theory of firm decision making ' (1963: 16) . As I argue in the next section, it was first with the construction of Nelson and Winter's (1982) 'Evolutionary Research Program' that the behavioral program was extended to incorporate 'micro assumptions appropriate to a theory of aggregate behavior' and therefore became a potential competitor of the orthodox microeconomic paradigm. 34. Herbert Simon (1976) has more recently argued that the indeterministic nature of the theory of oligopoly and its anomalous status within the program of situational determinism (S. Latsis 1972) is a very strong argument for switching from a standard 'substantive' to a 'procedural' concept of rationality: 'More than a century ago', Simon argues, 'Cournot identified a problem that has become the permanent and ineradicable scandal of economic theory. He observed that where a market is supplied by only a few producers, the notion of profit-maximization is ill-defined. The choice that would be substantively rational for each actor depends on the choices made by the other actors; none can choose without making assumptions about how others will choose. . . . There remains, however, a lingering reluctance to acknowledge the impossibility of discovering at last ''The Rule'' of substantively rational behaviour for the oligopolist. Only when the hope of that discovery has been finally extinguished will it be admitted that understanding imperfect competition means understanding procedural rationality' (1976: 140-1, my emphasis). Morgenstern's (1935 Morgenstern's ( /1976 and especially Hayek's (1937) insistence on the necessity of specifying the procedure by which agents can acquire perfect knowledge may possibly extend Simon's argument to even include the theory of perfect competition. The important difference between the two theories is that the reasoning process by which the agents reach their 'equilibrium choices' is included directly in the theory of oligopoly, while tacked onto the theory of perfect competition as a separate ad hoc construction. I return to this problem in the next section.
35. It is interesting to note that Alchian views his 1950 classic on 'Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory' as a direct result of the marginalist controversy in the 1940s between Machlup and Lester. Cf. Zerbe (1982: 149) . 36. Much earlier, another Austrian economist, Joseph Schumpeter had used a similar argument as the 'tight-system-constraint' or the 'selection' argument to defend the rationality assumption in economics: 'The assumption that conduct is prompt and rational is in all cases a fiction. But it proves to be sufficiently near to reality, if things have time to hammer logic into men. Where this has happened, and within the limits in which it has happened, one may rest content with this fiction and build theories ' (1934: 80, my emphasis) . Like Machlup, Schumpeter was aware that 'outside of these limits our fiction loses its closeness to reality. To cling to it there also, is to hide an essential thing and to ignore a fact which is theoretically important ' (1934: 80) . But while Machlup argued that these phenomena were outside the domain of economics, Schumpeter argued for the necessity for building an evolutionary theory or a 'dynamic' market theory for this extended domain. 37. An example of the distinction between formal and appreciative theory is Marshall's (1920) discussion of 'organic-evolutionary' metaphors to support his formal mechanical models. 38. In cases of under-determination, Friedman (1953) argued that we should use criteria such as 'simplicity' and 'fertility' to choose between two or more observationally equivalent theories. In the specific case, Friedman argued that T1 is not only 'simpler', but also more 'fertile' than T2. 39. For instance, this is confirmed by Fritz Machlup's (1967) very critical attitude towards the behavioral theory of the firm. Had Machlup followed a realist strategy a`la Nelson and Winter (1982) , he would at least have found some theoretical building blocks in the behavioral theory of the firm that was worth developing further, being so close to his own appreciative theory. 40. The first to formulate such a realist critique of the classical defense was Koopmans (1957) . His argument was that if we have reason to believe that a theoretical account T2 is truer than a theory T1, we should choose T2 and not T1 (as suggested by Friedman). Koopmans summarized: 'But if this [the selection argument] is the basis for our belief in profit maximization, then we should postulate that basis itself and not the profit maximization which it implies in certain circumstances ' (1957: 140-1) . 41. However, it is interesting to note that while Winter mainly looked for inspiration for his Evolutionary Economics in Fritz Machlup's (1946 Machlup's ( , 1955 Machlup's ( , and 1967 ad hoc defense of the profit-maximizing theory, he could, in fact, have gone at least one step further back, to Alfred Schutz. It seems very likely that a closer look at Schutz's work on 'the sociology of everyday life' could lead to the identification of further building blocs not only useful for Winter's own Evolutionary program, but also for an Evolutionary-Institutional program a`la Hayek that tries to solve the coordination problem in economics. 42. Sidney Winter (1986b) insists that our theoretical reconstructions of how firms behave should be in accordance with our common-sense interpretation and that we should avoid the 'discrepancies' that Machlup and Friedman allowed in the 'classical defense'. Ideally, we should therefore have a theory, which is 'portable between the domains of businessmen talk and economists talk' (I owe this expression to Sidney Winter).
43. Kirzner made an almost similar critique of another of the architects of the classical defense, Gary Becker (1962) : 'It follows, of course, that these expositions can in no sense claim to explain market processes, to explain the way in which market forces bring about adjustments in prices. It was brilliantly pointed out by Hayek many years ago the need for an adequate account of the attainment of equilibrium has been ignored (1962: 383). Kirzner argued that as a consequence of this problem we needed to introduce some kind of 'change agent' or 'entrepreneur' in order for our model to be 'intelligible' or 'understandable'. 44. Gordon and Hynes (1970) argued that 'this methodology is anomalous, precisely because the adjustment mechanisms are not linked to the analysis of utility or profitmaximizing behavior of the relevant economic units in the disequilibria positions' (p. 371, note, my emphasis). 45. Cf. Kirzner (1985) and O'Driscoll and Rizzo (1985) . 46. Cf. Viktor Vanberg (2002) for an interesting discussion and comparison of some of these 'behavioral-evolutionary' models with the standard 'rational choice' model. 47. The irony of this conclusion is of course that Machlup and Schutz participated in building an appreciative theory that was built to defend the marginalists but used by some heterodox traditionalists such as Nelson and Winter, and also the modern Austrians, to replace the same orthodoxy.
